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TYPES OF CONSENSUS IN PUBLIC






One of the most consistent findings of criminological research is
that members of different social groups seem to agree on their ratings of
the seriousness of crimes. This finding of consensus also appears to be
extremely robust, with alternative scaling techniques, cross-cultural
comparisons, and measures of related concepts (e.g., disapproval) yield-
ing similar results.I Unfortunately, clear guidelines for establishing how
much and what type of agreement qualifies as consensus have not been
established. Moreover, even if various types of consensus exist in public
evaluations of crime, an adequate explanation for these shared concep-
tions remains conspicuously absent.
This paper focuses on strategies for measuring "consensus" in pub-
lic evaluations of crime. It identifies four distinct types of consensus on
public ratings of crime in past research. To illustrate these types of con-
sensus and explore the differences between them, various statistical tech-
niques are used on a previously drawn sample of Baltimore residents2 to
measure the extent of each type of consensus. The types of consensus
required for various applications of these studies to theoretical and pol-
icy issues are also discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of
* The author would like to thank Peter Rossi for permission to reanalyze his data, and
Charles A. Moore and Bruce 0. Warren for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Portions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Society
of Criminology, Denver, Colorado, November 10-12, 1983.
** Assistant Professor of Sociology at University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire.
See G. NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTIONS IN LAW AND IN SIX CUL-
TURES (1976); Miethe, Public Consensus on Crime Seriousness: Normative Structure or Methodological
Artfact, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 515 (1982); Rossi & Henry, Seriousness: A MeasureforAlPurposes?, in
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION 489 (M. Klein & J. Teilman eds. 1980).
2 For a discussion of this sample, see Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes.:
Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224, 225-27 (1974).
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the implications of this research for public policy and criminological
theory.
II. OVERVIEW OF PAST STUDIES
Commentators have criticized studies of public evaluations of crime
on a number of methodological grounds.3 Researchers have addressed
some of these criticisms, such as a sample selection bias4 and the additiv-
ity assumption. 5 Other issues, such as the perceptual basis of seriousness
ratings6 and the extent of an aggregation bias, 7 remain and might se-
verely restrict the utility of these studies as a basis for public policy. In
fact, it is still unclear whether consensus in public ratings of crime truly
exists and, if it does, what the reasons are for these shared evaluations.
Definitive conclusions from past studies are not possible because re-
searchers have failed to specify how much and what type of agreement is
indicative of "consensus."
TYPES OF CONSENSUS AND STATISTICAL MEASURES
The dominant finding reported in past studies is that different so-
cial groups agree in their evaluations of crime.8 Unfortunately, when
consensus is reported as the major finding of a study, it is unclear what
this means. There appears to be at least four types of consensus that can
be obtained in public ratings of seriousness. These types of consensus
are created by considering two issues: 1) the type of ratings (relative
ordering or absolute magnitude), and 2) the degree of item inclusion
(global or local inclusion). The four kinds of consensus and the statisti-
cal measures associated with each type are summarized in Table 1.9
3 See Miethe, supra note 1, at 517-22.
4 See Turner, Introduction to THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (T. Sellin & M.
Wolfgang 2d ed. 1978) (discussing the reliance on college-student samples).
5 See Wellford & Wiatrowski, On the Measurement of Seriousness, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 175 (1975) (discussing whether seriousness scores can be added to form complex
events).
6 See Miethe, supra note 1, at 517-22 (discussing whether consensus in ratings of serious-
ness is attributable to shared conceptions of the conduct itself or shared perceptions of the
legal severity of acts).
7 See Rossi & Henry, supra note 1, at 493-94 (discussing an aggregation bias and the con-
sequence of using mean ratings of groups to measure consensus).
8 For reviews of the finding of consensus, see Miethe, supra note 1, at 515-17; Turner,
supra note 4.
9 This paper focuses on measuring consensus between groups on all acts or subsets of acts.
The appropriate statistical technique for measuring the amount of consensus on a particular
act is a measure of dispersion such as a standard deviation, coefficient of relative variation, or
interquartile ranges. For a discussion of these latter measures, see Chilton & DeAmicis, Over-
crbninalization and the Measurement of Consensus, 59 Soc. & Soc. RES. 318 (1975); Miethe, supra
note 1, at 521-22.
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TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF CONSENSUS AND
APPROPRIATE DATA-ANALYTIC STRATEGIES FOR









Pearson's r t-tests and Correlation
Spearman's rho Hotelling's t2
Correlation: Regression(a=0 b= 1)
Pearson's r t-tests and Correlation
Spearman's rho Hotelling's t 2
Notes: *See text for description of types of ratings and degree of item inclusion. The data-
analytic strategies are generally appropriate for either individual or aggregate levels
of analysis. With aggregate measures it is also necessary to examine the magnitude
of within-item variability for each group.
The first dimension of the typology (type of ratings) differentiates
between statements about the relative ordering of items in a scale and
the actual magnitude of the scores assigned by different social groups.
Although this distinction often becomes muddled, past studies typically
use relative consensus,'0 which is assessed by correlating the mean ratings
of different groups. A correlation greater than .70 has sometimes been
used as an indicator of this type of consensus.II The effect of aggrega-
tion, which inflates the magnitude of the association, is gauged by com-
paring the correlation between group means with either the average
individual-individual correlation 12 or the average individual-group cor-
relation.' 3 The results of such comparisons tend to support the conclu-
sion that, even at the individual level, there is remarkable agreement in
the relative ratings of seriousness.
Absolute consensus is far more restrictive than relative consensus. It
10 See T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964); Cul-
len, Link & Polanzi, The Seriousness of Crime Revisited- Have Attitudes Toward White-Collar Crime
Changed?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1982); Figlio, The Seriousness of Offenses: An Evaluation of Oj9end-
ers and Aronoenders, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1975); Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk,
supra note 2; Sinden, Oenders' Gender and Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, I Soc. SPECTRUM 39
(1981).
II Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, supra note 2, at 227.
12 See McClearly, O'Neil, Epperlein, Jones & Gray, Eects of Legal Education and Work Expe-
rience on Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 28 Soc. PROBS. 276 (1981).
13 Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, supra note 2, at 235-36.
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refers to cases in which the ordering of items and the numerical scores
assigned to each item are similar across and within social groups. Two
different analytic strategies are available to measure this type of consen-
sus. 14 First, a regression analysis can be performed on the mean scores of
different groups, with absolute consensus being supported if the inter-
cept and slope of the regression equation are not significantly different
from the hypothesized values (i.e., a=O; b=l). A second approach in-
volves t-test comparisons of group means for each item and the correla-
tion of mean ratings across all items. If there are no significant
differences in group means and the mean scores are highly correlated,
then the results support absolute consensus. With both strategies for
evaluating absolute consensus, however, it is necessary to examine the
degree of variability around the mean ratings as evidence of within-
group dissensus.
It is important to note that the existence of absolute consensus, as
defined here, also reflects relative consensus. In contrast, one might
achieve perfect relative consensus with little or no absolute agreement.
For example, this might occur if male and female scores are perfectly
correlated, but females considered all acts as more serious than males.
The second dimension (degree of item inclusion) is what Rossi and
Henryi5 refer to as a distinction between "global" and "local" consen-
sus. Global consensus is defined as agreement in ratings across the total list
of items included in a scale. Local consensus, on the other hand, refers to
agreement on items that are either close together on the scale (e.g., the
most serious crimes) or of a particular type (e.g., white-collar violations
or violent crimes). Although a few exceptions exist,' 6 previous research
has focused on global consensus.
Table 1, combining these two dimensions, reveals four distinct
types of consensus: global relative, global absolute, local relative, local
absolute. Past studies reporting consensus in ratings of seriousness usu-
ally mean the global relative type. In particular, these studies usually
evaluate consensus by computing correlation coefficients on the basis of
14 There are, of course, other strategies for measuring absolute consensus. One useful
measure is the T statistic for testing the differences, between mean vectors. See D. MORRISON,
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS (1976): This test statistic evaluates the likelihood
that two sets of sample means were generated from the same population. A number of test
statistics (e.g., standardized residuals) are also available in SPSS-X and SAS to detect influen-
tial points and outliers in regression models. These latter statistics are useful to locate the
source of deviations from, and contributions to, absolute consensus. A strategy for measuring
absolute consensus on individual acts is to examine the percent of variation in individual
ratings of the seriousness of a particular act explained by respondents' demographic profile.
For an application of this approach to measure consensus between groups, see Hawkins,
Causal Attribution and Punishment for Crime, 2 DEVIANT BEHAV. 207 (1981).
15 Rossi & Henry, supra note 1, at 494.
16 See Figlio, supra note 10; Hawkins, supra note 14; Rossi & Henry, supra note 1.
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mean ratings across the entire range of items. Using this strategy, it is
common to obtain high correlations between group means (r's > .90).
There are, however, two major problems with this strategy for measur-
ing consensus. First, an aggregate-level correlational approach ignores
individual variability. Second, agreement on the ratings of only a few
items, especially those at the extremes of the scale that provide the larg-
est contribution to the covariance, may mask widespread disagreement
on the ratings of the majority of items. 17 This latter problem exists re-
gardless of the unit of analysis. A preoccupation with this type of con-
sensus, to the neglect of other types and measures, might severely distort
the extent of agreement among social groups in their ratings of serious-
ness of crimes.
III. METHODS
Data collected by Rossi et al.18 was reanalyzed to demonstrate the
various measures of consensus at the individual and aggregate levels of
analysis. The Rossi study consists of a block quota sample of 125 white
and 75 black Baltimore residents. The interviewees rated subsets of 140
criminal offenses on a nine-point scale ranging from most (9) to least (1)
serious. Two lists of eighty acts were used, with twenty acts common to
both lists and sixty acts being different on each list.19 There were sixty-
three whites and thirty-seven blacks assigned to rate acts in the first list;
sixty-two whites and thirty-eight blacks rated the other acts.
The criminal acts were derived by transforming the Uniform Cime
Reports' 20 listing of general crime categories into specific acts.2 I To as-
sess the extent of local consensus, the acts were regrouped into the fol-
lowing categories: personal, violent crimes; 22 property offenses; 23 white
collar offenses;24 victimless crimes;25 and public order violations. 2 6 Mul-
17 For related discussions, see Chilton & DeAmicis, supra note 9; Miethe, supra note 1, at
517-18; Rossi & Henry, supra note 1, at 493-95. As an example of how a preoccupation with
global relative consensus can mask dissensus among groups, Figlio found that the geometric
mean ratings of institutionalized samples of adult and juvenile offenders were highly corre-
lated (r=.962). See Figlio, supra note 10, at 194. Yet, when the assaults were excluded, this
correlation dropped to .59 (these correlations were calculated from Table IV).
18 Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, supra note 2.
19 For a full discussion of the sample and methodology, see Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk,
supra note 2, at 225-27.
20 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONs 5-155 (1982).
21 See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, supra note 2, at 228, Table 1.
22 Thirty personal, violent crimes, such as murder, assault, and rape, were included in this
category.
23 Twenty-six property offenses, such as breaking/entering, shoplifting, and burglary,
were included in this category.
24 Thirteen white collar offenses, such as embezzlement, stock fraud, and repair and ser-
vice overcharge, were included in this category.
1984]
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TABLE 2
CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSES OF MEAN
RATINGS OF WHITES AND BLACKS FOR ALL ACTS
AND SUBSETS OF ACTS*
N of F-ratios for
Acts (acts) r Regression Model** Ho: a=0 and b=l***
ALL ACTS (140) .897 Y, = -. 369 + .
9 94 Xb F2,138 = 31.11"***
(.052) (.042)
VIOLENT ( 30) .936 Y_ = -. 558 + 1.05 3 Xb F2,28  = 3.55
(.063) (.075)
PROPERTY ( 26) .667 Yw = -. 007 + .897Xb F2,24  = 11.39"***
(.138) (.205)
WHITE COLLAR ( 13) .932 Yw = -. 766 + 1.09 6 Xb F2, 1  = 2.55
(.094) (.091)
VICTIMLESS ( 12) .933 Yw = -1.19 + 1.04 9 Xb F2,10  = 14.62"***
(.158) (.130)
PUBLIC ORDER ( 29) .837 Yw = -. 124 + .973 Xb F2.2 7 = 1.73
(.145) (.122)
Notes: *The number of respondents used in the computation of each mean rating
ranged from 37 to 75 for blacks and 62 to 125 for whites.
**In each regression model, Y, refers to the predicted mean ratings of whites and
Xb refers to the mean ratings of blacks. The standard errors for the t-tests of
the separate hypotheses that a=0 and b= I are in parentheses ).
255S, - 25SS2/2
***The F-tests are based on the Formula:
SS,/N-2
where ISS, refers to the sum of squared errors for the estimated model in
which the hypotheses are imposed and 1SS9 refers to the sum of the squared
errors for the estimated model. For a discussion of this F-test, see Namboodiri,
Carter & Blalock, supra note 29, at 164-66.
****Significant at p < .01, i.e., reject H0 of absolute consensus.
tiple expert judges were used for the subclassification of acts. 27 Thirty
acts that received multiple classifications were excluded from the analy-
sis of the extent of local consensus. For purposes of illustrating the differ-
ent kinds of consensus, correlation, t-tests, and regression analyses were
restricted to comparisons of the ratings of black and white
respondents.
28
25 Twelve victimless crimes, such as homosexuality, prostitution, and selling or using her-
oin, LSD, or pep pills, were included in this category.
26 Twenty-nine public order violations, such as income tax violations, loitering, and join-
ing a riot/demonstration, were included in this category.
27 The multiple expert judges were four individuals employed in the field of criminal
justice. These judges independently classified each act into one of the five categories.
28 Because the major purpose of this study is to illustrate how to assess different kinds of
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IV. RESULTS
MEASURES AND TYPES OF CONSENSUS
Correlation and regression analyses of the mean ratings of blacks
and whites were performed on the total set of acts and particular subsets
of acts. Table 2 summarizes the extent of the four types of consensus.
The typical measure of consensus (global relative) requires correlat-
ing group means across all acts. As shown in Table 2, the mean ratings
of the races across all acts exhibit a high degree of global relative consen-
sus (r=.897). Black and white ratings of violent, white-collar, and vic-
timless crimes are also highly correlated (r's > .930), reflecting local
relative consensus on these subsets of acts. The mean ratings for public
order crimes are moderately related (r=.837), but there is relatively little
local relative consensus on the ratings of property offenses (r=.667).
If the mean ratings of blacks and whites exhibit absolute consensus,
the intercept and unstandardized regression coefficient for the model Y,
= a + bXb should not depart significantly from their hypothesized val-
ues (a=0 and b=1). The hypothesized model (y = 0 + 1X = X) was
compared with the estimated model (y = a + bX) and the reduction of
errors in prediction was assessed. 29 If the reduction in prediction errors
is insignificant, the hypothesis of absolute consensus between mean rat-
ings of blacks and whites would not be rejected. Table 2 displays the
regression equations and the tests of absolute consensus for all acts and
subsets of acts.
As shown in Table 2, the data does not support the hypothesis of
global absolute consensus (F2, 38=3 1.11, p < .0 1). Although the slope is
not significantly different from 1, the intercept reveals that, overall,
blacks considered the acts more serious than whites. For violent, white-
collar, and public order offenses, however, the reduction of prediction
errors is insignificant, indicating local absolute consensus for these
acts. 30 In contrast, the data does not support the hypothesis of local
consensus, racial differences were examined because the use of quota sampling in the original
study guaranteed a sufficient number of blacks and whites in the sample. In terms of all
possible bivariate comparisons of demographic characteristics, however, it was also expected
that such groups should exhibit the most dissensus based on previous research and theories of
racial differences in criminal and non-criminal conduct. For an investigation of racial differ-
ences in ratings of severity of punishments, see Hawkins, supra note 14.
29 This test of absolute consensus is identical to a test of reliability. An F-test is used to
assess the reduction in prediction errors in the two models because two constraints are im-
posed on the hypothesized model (i.e., a=0 and b=1). For a discussion of this test and the
computation of the sum of squared errors in prediction for the models, see K. NAMBOODIRI,
L. CARTER & H. BLALOCK, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
164-66 (1975).
30 The results of the regression analyses are similar to those obtained by using both t-tests




THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF RATER'S DEMOGRAPHIC








SD Range Most Common
R2*** of R2's of R
2's %R2's > .10 Predictors****
.088 .039 .013-.157 26.7% (8/30) Age (4)
Race X Ed (3)
Race X Sex (2)
.144 .044 .056-.252 88.5% (23/26) Ed (4)
Race (3)
.108 .049 .044-.231 53.9% (7/13) Age (3)
Race X Sex (2)
Race X Ed (1)
.187 .086 .094-.352 91.7% (11/12) Race (2)
Age (2)
.137 .057 .047-.308 75.9% (22/29) Race X Sex (9)
Race X Ed (4)
Sex X Ed (4)
Race (2)
Ed (3)
Notes: *The demographic characteristics of the respondent included in this analysis
were race, sex, education level, age, victimization experience, and all two-way
interactions between race, sex, and education. See text for a coding of these
variables.
**N of acts refers to the number of acts included in each subset.
***R 2 refers to the average proportion of variation in individual ratings of each act
explained by respondent characteristics. It was computed by summing up the
R2 's for each act and dividing by the number of acts in its respective subset.
****The most common predictors are those demographic variables that were found
to be significant in the analysis of each act's seriousness. The number of acts
within each subset that contained these variables as significant predictors are in
parentheses ().
absolute consensus on ratings of property or victimless crimes.
A series of regression analyses were performed to assess the level of
absolute consensus on individual ratings of each act. In particular, the
proportion of variation in each act's seriousness accounted for by the
respondent's demographic profile was examined. The demographic
variables used in this analysis were race (black, white), sex, education
significant differences in means are observed for the white-collar offenses, and only one of the
thirty t-tests are significant for the violent acts. The mean ratings for these acts are also
highly correlated (see Table 1), reflecting local absolute consensus for these acts. On the other
hand, although the mean ratings are highly correlated, 50% (6/12) of the t-tests for the vic-
timless crimes are significant, suggesting local relative but no absolute consensus in black and
white ratings of these acts.
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TABLE 4
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF RELATIVE CONSENSUS
FOR ALL 140 CRIMES AND SUBSETS OF CRIMES
FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE AND EACH
RACE
Acts (R of acts)* N** sd of r's range of r's
140 ACTS (6.27)
Total 193 .567 .189 -. 05 - .87
Whites 120 .549 .174 .01 - .81
Blacks 73 .482 .188 .00 - .79
30 VIOLENT (7.39)
Total 192 .535 .283 -. 33 - .93
Whites 120 .536 .274 -. 30 - .96
Blacks 72 .478 .288 -. 27 - .91
26 PROPERTY (5.87)
Total 193 .419 .304 -. 50 - .91
Whites 120 .355 .268 -. 49 - .78
Blacks 73 .215 .340 -. 58 - .83
13 WHITE COLLAR (5.77)
Total 185 .452 .434 -. 99 - .99
Whites 115 .424 .424 -. 99 - .98
Blacks 70 .371 .443 -. 88 - .98
12 VICTIMLESS (6.17)
Total 185 .574 .329 -. 63 - 1.00
Whites 117 .544 .360 -. 63 - 1.00
Blacks 68 .533 .314 -. 64 - .95
29 PUBLIC ORDER (5.13)
Total 193 .545 .270 -. 40 - .94
Whites 120 .538 .242 -. 35 - .94
Blacks 73 .419 .285 -. 31 - .93
Notes: *R of acts refers to the grand mean of all acts in that subset for all respondents.
**N refers to the number of individuals on which the correlation is based. The
sample sizes vary because of the exclusion of individuals in each subset who had
no variation in their ratings of acts.
***ri. refers to the average correlation between each individual's ratings and the
mean ratings of their respective group. For the total row, R is the mean for all
individuals, for whites it is the mean for all whites, and for blacks it is the mean
rating given by all blacks.
(high school, college), age, victimization experiences (yes, no), and a set
of interaction terms for race and sex, race and education, and education
and sex. Table 3 summarizes the most common predictors, the average
R 2 , and other descriptive statistics for each subset of acts.
As shown in Table 3, there is a great deal of variation in the predic-
tive power of demographic variables within and between each subset of
acts. Relatively little of the variation in ratings of violent, white-collar,
TERANCE D. MIETHE
or public order offenses is explained by the respondent's demographic
profile,3 ' a finding consistent with the previous analyses of racial differ-
ences. For property and victimless crimes, on the other hand, a sizeable
proportion of the variation in each act is accounted for by the demo-
graphic characteristics of the respondent, suggesting little absolute con-
sensus in ratings of these acts. The most important predictors for these
acts are the race, educational level, and age of the respondent: older
people considered victimless crimes more serious than did younger peo-
ple; those with some college education considered property crime less
serious than did those with no college education; and whites considered
property crime more serious and victimless crimes less serious than did
blacks. Thus, although characteristics of the offense have been shown to
influence ratings of seriousness,32 characteristics of the respondent also
have a noteworthy impact on the ratings of victimless and property
crimes, explaining at least 10% of the variation for at least 80% of these
acts.
MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL CONSENSUS
The effect of aggregation on the findings of relative consensus was
evaluated by computing the average correlation between each individ-
ual's scores and the mean ratings for all individuals. These average indi-
vidual-mean correlations were also computed separately within each
racial grouping. Table 4 presents the results of these individual-level
comparisons.
The average individual-mean correlation is .567, whereas separate
analysis by race reveals greater agreement among whites than blacks (ri,
= .549 and .482, respectively). Thus, the extent of global relative con-
sensus is reduced from .897 to .567 as the unit of analysis shifts from
groups to individuals. Although aggregation effects are present, a mod-
est degree of this type of consensus remains at the individual level.
33
The possibility that global relative consensus is attributable to
agreement at the extremes of the scale (i.e., the most and least serious
acts) was examined by performing separate analyses for subsets of
31 Significant differences by several categories exist even for some acts in these categories,
however.
32 SeeT. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 10; Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, supra note 2;
T. Miethe, The Social and Methodological Determinants of Consensus in Public Evaluations
of Crime (unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Soci-
ety of Criminology, Denver, Colorado, Nov. 10-12, 1983).
33 When the average individual-individual correlation rij is used as the measure of relative
consensus at the individual level, the ordering of the subsets of acts is similar to that reported
in Table 4, but the magnitude of the consensus is far less. The corresponding values for the
rij's are: .311, .279, .254, .251, .339, and .292. Support for relative consensus at the individual
level is less convincing when these latter coefficients are used.
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crimes. As shown in Table 4, the most serious acts (violent and vic-
timless crimes) and least serious acts (public order crimes) exhibit the
highest levels of individual agreement and make the largest contribution
to the overall level of global relative consensus. In contrast, acts consid-
ered moderately serious (property and white-collar crimes) elicit the
least individual agreement.34 Comparisons of correlations and standard
deviations within each race reveal greater relative consensus among
whites than blacks for all acts and subsets of acts. Thus, it appears that
a preoccupation with global relative consensus can mask systematic var-
iation between and within social groups in their ratings of subsets of acts
even at the individual level of analysis.
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of this study illustrate that different analytic strategies
yield different conclusions about the extent of consensus in blacks' and
whites' ratings of crime seriousness. Using a correlational approach, the
mean ratings of the races exhibit a high level of relative consensus across
all acts and for the violent, white-collar, victimless, and public order
subsets of acts. There is a moderate amount of global relative consensus
even at the individual level, but this is due largely to agreement on the
ratings of the most serious acts (violent, victimless) and least serious acts
(public order). Regression analyses reveal absolute consensus on the rat-
ings of violent, white-collar, and public order offenses, but not on the
victimless crimes. Neither absolute nor relative consensus is observed in
the ratings of property offenses. Similar results are found when other
demographic characteristics of the respondent are considered. Individ-
ual-level comparisons and the analysis of within-group variation reveal
greater agreement among whites than blacks.
Past researchers assert that studies of public evaluations of crime
are relevant to a number of policy issues. For example, particular states
are requesting these studies as a basis for equating legal proscriptions
with public opinion,35 and as a means of allocating prosecutorial re-
sources on criminal cases.36 Implicit in these applications is the belief
that public consensus in ratings of criminal acts exists. Unfortunately, it
is unclear how much and what type of agreement qualifies as public
consensus. Given the existence of absolute consensus in ratings of vio-
34 The grand means for all acts in each subset for all respondents are presented in paren-
theses in Table 4. The relatively high grand mean for the victimless crimes (6.17) is largely
due to the inclusion of selling heroin and LSD as victimless crimes. Excluding these acts
reduces the average individual-mean correlation from .574 to .525 for the victimless crimes.
35 Rossi & Henry, supra note 1, at 495-502.




lent, white-collar, and public order offenses, these findings might serve
as a rational basis for adjusting statutory penalties for these acts.37 It is
still uncertain, however, how seriousness ratings can be calibrated into
criminal sanctions. Further, as illustrated in Table 3, racial and other
differences exist even for these crimes. Thus, adjusting statutory penal-
ties to be congruent with ratings of seriousness is questionable because
these penalties would not accurately represent public sentiments even
under conditions of absolute consensus.
The utility of studies of crime seriousness for policymakers appears
to depend upon the identification of factors that influence ratings of
crime. In other words, the finding of absolute consensus in ratings of
subsets of acts becomes meaningful to judicial or legislative decision-
making only when factors influencing these ratings are identified and
tested.
A review of past studies suggests that respondents consider a variety
of circumstances and characteristics of the offense when rating the seri-
ousness of crimes. For example, in a previous analysis of the Baltimore
data, Miethe 38 found that over 71% of the variation in mean seriousness
ratings was explained by the type of harm, intentionality of the act, and
whether victim consent was implied in the offense descriptions. The de-
gree of harm (e.g., amount of physical injury or monetary loss) has also
been shown to influence the seriousness of acts. 39 Further, Sykes and
West 40 found that respondents consider the amount of harm suffered,
the degree of intent, motive, and characteristics of the victim and the
offender when evaluating an act. Unfortunately, none of the previous
analyses of the determinants of seriousness have considered the unique
and interactive effects of these variables. The use of factorial designs, in
which combinations of these factors are introduced in the offense de-
scriptions, should be encouraged as a strategy for examining the unique
and interactive effects of these variables on ratings of seriousness.
An examination of the ratings given to particular acts within each
subset of crimes reveals some other factors that might explain ratings of
seriousness. For example, the high level of relative consensus on aggre-
gate and individual ratings of victimless crimes is largely due to agree-
ment on the most serious acts (e.g., selling/using heroin or selling LSD),
acts that are typically viewed as harmful to users and others. Similarly,
37 The existence of absolute consensus means that relative consensus also exists. See text
accompanying Table 1.
38 T. Miethe, supra note 32.
39 See Riedel, Perceived Circumstances, Inferences of Intent, andjudgments of Ofnse Seriousness, 66
J. GRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201 (1975); T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 10.
40 G. Sykes & S. West, The Seriousness of Crime: A Study of Popular Morality (unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the Annual Meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society,
1978).
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even though absolute consensus exists in ratings of violent and white-
collar offenses, a closer examination of particular acts suggests some ad-
ditional factors influencing judgments of seriousness. In particular,
blacks considered twenty-two of the thirty violent offenses as slightly
more serious than whites. Yet, all impulsive slayings and most of the
violent offenses against strangers were considered slightly more serious
by whites, suggesting that particular characteristics of the offense and
the participants are differentially evaluated by blacks and whites.
White-collar crimes involving victimization of consumers (e.g., using in-
accurate scales to weigh meat, fixing prices on products, false advertis-
ing, and refusal to make rental repairs) were considered slightly more
serious by blacks. In contrast, whites considered crimes against business
(e.g., embezzlement and illegal interest rates) as being slightly more seri-
ous than did blacks, suggesting that the relevance of the act to one's
personal experiences and the likelihood of exposure to it influence rat-
ings of seriousness.4 ' Thus, the application of seriousness studies to pub-
lic policy decisions appears to be premature until factors influencing
ratings of seriousness and explanations for consensus have been identi-
fied and tested.
The distinctions between types of consensus illustrated in this paper
are directly relevant to policy and theoretical issues. For example, a
finding of relative consensus in ratings of "powerless" and "elite" group-
ings is largely irrelevant as a basis for evaluating consensual or conflict
models of law creation.4 2 If a conflict perspective is supported, however,
one would expect differences in the magnitude of ratings assigned by
social groups to particular acts (e.g., victimless crimes, white-collar vio-
lations), suggesting that the presence or absence of local absolute con-
sensus is the type of consensus that is the most appropriate for
addressing these issues.4 3 Similarly, attempts to translate seriousness rat-
ings into legal sanctions would best be accomplished only under condi-
tions of absolute consensus. In contrast, when using these studies as a
basis for allocating police or prosecutorial resources to fight crime or for
cross-cultural comparisons, a finding of global or local relative consensus
is probably sufficient. 44
41 For a related discussion, see Hawkins, supra note 14.
42 The consensus model of law creation posits that law reflects public sentiments about
particular conduct, whereas the conflict model proposes that law is a reflection of the moral-
ity of those few who are in a position to have their interests codified as law. A finding of
relative consensus is largely irrelevant to an evaluation of these models because it is the magni-
tude of ratings given particular acts, rather than their relative ordering, that would illustrate a
disparity between the powerless and powerful.
43 For a test of these models, see Sinden, Perceptions of Crime in Capitalist America: The Ques-
tion of Consciousness Manipulation, 13 Soc. Focus 75 (1980).
44 Again, the use of these studies for addressing theoretical or programmatic issues is pre-
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The distinction between relative and absolute agreement also
should be useful for evaluating theories of criminal behavior. For exam-
ple, a variety of subcultural theories posit that different rates of criminal
behavior among social groups is the result of a lifestyle that is not neces-
sarily opposed to the mainstream ideology but, rather, places greater
importance on particular values. In other words, different social groups
may agree on the relative importance of attitudes, values, or behavior,
but it is their absolute importance that contributes to deviant conduct.
The subculture of violence thesis,45 for example, posits that within
particular social groups there is a value system that encourages a violent
response to threatening stimuli. It argues further that there is a differen-
tial perception of anger-provoking stimuli, with "trivial" altercations be-
coming fighting words among particular groups. In terms of the relative
and absolute distinction, one would expect blacks and whites to agree in
their relative ratings of violent acts, but lower-class, black males con-
sider these acts more serious than other social groups. 4 6 Similarly, the
notion of "focal concerns" of lower class youth 47 and the image of
"lower class value stretch" 48 are suggestive of a distinction between
agreement among social groups in the relative ordering of values and
disagreement among those groups in their absolute endorsement of
them.
Given the volume of studies on public images of crime, it is surpris-
ing that a definitive statement about the extent of agreement in public
ratings of the seriousness of crime cannot be made. The fact that vari-
ous degrees and types of consensus can be found in the same data, how-
ever, is not necessarily bothersome. It simply requires researchers to pay
more attention to the variety of techniques available to measure consen-
sus and to specify the type of consensus that is most appropriate for the
particular research question. Although a finding of absolute consensus
appears to be most relevant for policy issues and theoretical develop-
ment, relative consensus might be adequate for some research purposes.
mature until factors influencing ratings of seriousness have been clearly identified and tested.
Once this is done, however, the distinction between types of consensus seems to be relevant for
addressing these issues. The relevance ofcrime seriousness studies as a basis for evaluating the
competing theories of law has been questioned. See Rossi & Henry, supra note 1.
45 M. WOLFGANG & F. FERRACUTI, THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE (1967).
46 Although an adequate measure ofsocial class was absent in the original study, the finds
reported earlier are not consistent with the subculture of violence thesis. In particular, the
findings of absolute consensus between blacks and whites in their ratings of the violent of-
fenses and that white, college-educated respondents considered these acts more serious than
less-educated blacks are inconsistent with the basic assumption underlying the subculture of
violence argument.
47 Miller, Lower-Class Culture as a Generating Milieu ofGang Delinquen, 14 J. Soc. IssuEs 5
(1958).
48 Rodman, The Lower Class Value Stretch, 42 Soc. FORCES 205 (1963).
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This research should be useful for future studies of public evalua-
tions of crime. If researchers adopt multiple strategies for measuring
different types of consensus, we will be more confident about the nature
and extent of public agreement on ratings of crime. By investigating
different types of consensus and factors that contribute to these ratings,
researchers will be in a better position to determine whether studies of
crime seriousness are useful for judicial decisionmaking and for evaluat-
ing different theories of law and criminal behavior.
